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PUNISHING DEPICTIONS OF ANIMAL CRUELTY:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR A VALID RESTRICTION ON SPEECH?
Kerry Adams*
INTRODUCTION
Two roosters are in a ring, pecking and clawing at each other, fighting to the
death.' People stand around the ring and cheer for the rooster they have placed
their money on. Feathers can be seen flying, the roosters are getting bloodied, and
are blinding each other. 2 Every state in the United States bans cockfighting; how-
ever, it is not banned in Puerto Rico, where this particular cockfight is taking
place.3 When these legally staged cockfights are broadcast to the United States for
commercial gain, the seller can be criminally prosecuted.4
In the first case of its kind in the country, Robert Stevens of Virginia was con-
victed of selling dog fighting videos.5 The videos he sold were of dog fights that
took place in Japan, where dog fighting is legal, and in the United States, before
dog fighting was banned.6 Mr. Stevens was sentenced to 37 months in prison, and
has appealed his conviction.7 The appeal is currently pending in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. A ruling is expected soon.
8
The law, which makes the above-described activity a crime, is being chal-
lenged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida by
Advanced Consulting and Marketing, Inc., a media group which broadcasts legally
staged cockfights over the internet on a website entitled
www.toughsportslive.com. 9 The law is being challenged on the grounds that it
abridges speech protected by the First Amendment.10 More specifically, Advanced
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law; B.S. 1999, Florida South-
ern College.
1. Peter Whoriskey, Cockfighting on Web Enters Legal Arena, WASH. POST, July, 22, 2007, at A3, avail-
able at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/search.html?nid-rollarchives (enter the article name in the
search box).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2008).
5. Paula Reed Ward, Is Video of Dog Fighting Free Speech? Cruelty Conviction Appealed,. Prrr. POST-
GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 2006, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06299/733101-85.stm.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Adam Liptak, First Amendment Claim in Cockfight Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/1 lhus/1 lroosters.html. This case had been decided at time of publication, with
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruling that 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2008) is an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the First Amendment right of Free Speech. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220 (3d Cir.
2008).
9. Complaint at 2, Advanced Consulting and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales, No. 1:o7cv21767, 2007 WL
2049319 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2007).
10. Id. at 1.
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Consulting and Marketing, Inc. is challenging the law on the grounds that it is a
content-based restriction on speech, overbroad, and vague. 1 Robert Stevens is also
arguing in his appeal that the law is a violation of his First Amendment right of
freedom of speech. 12
In this comment, I will argue that the law making it a crime to sell depictions
of animal cruelty is unconstitutional. I will argue that it violates the freedom of
speech clause of the First Amendment by showing that the law is a content-based
restriction on speech, overbroad, and vague. I will also argue that it does not fall
into any exception to First Amendment free speech protection. Finally, I will sug-
gest a way of writing the law so that it is no longer unconstitutional.
Part I of this comment will discuss 18 U.S.C. § 48, which punishes depictions
of animal cruelty. The congressional debate on the statute will also be discussed in
this section. Part II will discuss the First Amendment and exceptions to the First
Amendment, which include defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
produced using real children. Part III will analyze the claim that the statute vi-
olates the First Amendment due to its restriction on content-based speech. Part IV
will analyze the claim that the statute is overbroad. Part V will analyze the claim
that the statute is vague as to what conduct is and is not prohibited. Part VI will
discuss the child pornography exception to First Amendment protection, and will
discuss how depictions of animal cruelty do not fall into this exception. Part VII
will discuss the obscenity exception to First Amendment protection, and will dis-
cuss a possible way for the statute to be rewritten to fall into this exception.
I. 18 U.S.C. § 48
A. Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty
In 1999, President Clinton signed 18 U.S.C. § 48 into law. 13 The statute states
that a person who sells, creates, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the
intent of placing it into interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain can be
imprisoned for no more than five years and/or fined. 14 There is an exception to this
statute, which states it does not apply to a depiction that has serious political, edu-
cational, religious, journalistic, historical, scientific, or artistic value. '" According
to the statute, a "depiction of animal cruelty" means "any visual or auditory depic-
tion," including any video, photograph, motion-picture film, sound recording, or
electronic image in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, tortured, muti-
lated, killed, or wounded. 16 To be punishable, the conduct being depicted must be
illegal under federal law or the law of the state in which the sale, creation, or pos-
11. Id. at 7-8.
12. Ward, supra note 5.
13. Complaint, supra note 9.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2008).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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session took place. 17 The sale, creation, or possession can be punished even if the
animal cruelty being depicted took place in a state where the act is legal. 18 The
statute defines "State" as any state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and other territories, commonwealths, or possessions of the United
States. 19
B. House Debate on the Statute
On October 19, 1999, the House of Representatives debated whether to pass 18
U.S.C. § 48, which would punish depictions of animal cruelty. 20 Representative
Bill McCollum of Florida was the first to speak in support of passage of the bill.21
Mr. McCollum stated that in the subcommittee hearing on this bill, a California
prosecutor and police officer described a growing industry that deals with depic-
tions of animal cruelty.22 The growing industry involves selling "crush" videos, in
which women, either barefoot or in high heels, slowly crush small animals, includ-
ing hamsters, cats, dogs and monkeys.23 Mr. McCollum watched a "crush" video
and stated a small animal was pinned down on the floor and a woman in high-
heeled stilettos talked in vulgar language to the animal while slowly crushing each
of its limbs.24 The subcommittee did not view the entire video, but was informed
"the animal was literally crushed into the ground over a period of 10 or 12 mi-
nutes., 25 The prosecutor and police officer informed the subcommittee that these
videos are sold because they appeal to people with a specific sexual fetish who find
these depictions "sexually arousing., 26 They also explained they are not able to
prosecute those who make these videos because the women's faces are often not
shown, and there is no way to tell where or when the videos were made.27 As a
result, authorities are not able to prosecute under existing state animal cruelty sta-
tutes.28
Mr. McCollum stated this bill would stop the interstate and international sale of
"crush" videos. 29 He addressed concerns of those who stated the statute would
punish those selling depictions of hunting and fishing, or those making and selling
documentaries on bullfighting or elephant poaching.30 Mr. McCollum stated that
these types of programs would fall within the exception to the statute since they
have serious religious, scientific, political, educational, journalistic, artistic, or his-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 145 CONG. REc. H. 10,267 (1999).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
Spring 2009
3
: Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
206 Barry Law Review Vol. 12
toric value.31 Further, in order for an image to be deemed illegal, the activity de-
picted must be illegal under either federal law or the state law where the creation,
possession or sale took place; therefore, hunting and fishing videos would not be
found illegal since neither activity is illegal under federal or state law.32
Mr. McCollum stated the bill would not criminalize the mere possession of
these videos, but would criminalize possession with the intent to place the depic-
tion in interstate commerce, which the government would have the burden of prov-
ing.33 He noted that Congress has the power to pass this bill since Congress alone
has the power to regulate interstate commerce.3 4 Mr. McCollum also claimed it is
a valid bill because it is narrowly tailored and addresses only conduct which state
law cannot reach.35
Other Representatives also gave arguments in support of passage of this bill.
Representative Elton Gallegly of California, the sponsor of the bill, stated that stu-
dies have found that people who torture or commit violent acts on animals go on to
commit violent acts on people.36 This is the case with many well known serial kill-
ers. 3  Representative Spencer Bachus from Alabama argued that when young
people view videos like "crush" videos, they become desensitized to this type of
violence, and it can be a "gateway" to more violent acts such as murder. 38 He
stated the First Amendment does need to be protected, but so do our children.39
Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas argued that the federal government
should pass this bill to make a moral statement about what behavior is viewed as
intolerable.4°
Representative Robert Scott of Virginia was the first to speak against passage
of the bill.41 He argued Congress has the power to constitutionally prohibit cruelty
to animals but cannot constitutionally prohibit communications regarding animal
cruelty. 42 Mr. Scott contended depictions of animal cruelty are no different than
the content of closed circuit films showing actual robberies or crimes being com-
mitted, which are shown on television shows such as Cops. 43 He maintained the
Supreme Court has consistently refused to carve out exceptions to the First
Amendment, and the speech prohibited by this bill does not fall into any exception
to First Amendment protection. 44 Mr. Scott looked at the obscenity exception to
the First Amendment and reasoned that some videos which would be prohibited by
the bill are obscene, but many videos that would be covered by the bill are not ob-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 145 CoNG. REC. H. at 10,267.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 10,269.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10,271.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
42. Id. at 10,268.
43. Id.
44. Id.
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol12/iss1/6
Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty
scene. 45 Mr. Scott also stated the government does not have a compelling interest
to criminalize depictions of animal cruelty because animal rights do not supersede
fundamental human constitutional rights. 46 He argued the bill is not narrowly tai-
lored, because to be narrowly tailored, it would need to punish those committing
the actual acts of animal cruelty, not those selling videos of the animal cruelty. 47
Other representatives argued against passage of the bill as well. Representative
Bob Barr of Georgia stated all fifty states already criminalize animal cruelty, which
is really what this bill is attempting to do.48 Representative Ron Paul of Texas
maintained that this bill would open "Pandora's box" because it is too broad.49 He
argued the bill is not intended to punish the sale of videos depicting hunting or
fishing, but legislation often "gets carried away and is misinterpreted. 5°
The debate in the House of Representatives ended with the House passing the
bill on October 19, 1999. 51 There were 372 ayes and 42 nays on the passage of this
bill.52 President Clinton signed the bill into law on December 3, 1999. 51
II. FIRST AMENDMENT AND EXCEPTIONS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The First Amendment to the Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law.
abridging the freedom of speech .... Generally, the First Amendment does
not allow the government to dictate what is seen, spoken, read, or heard.5 5 The
Supreme Court, however, has carved out some exceptions to First Amendment
protection. In the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court
noted freedom of speech does not protect defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
pornography produced using real children.56
III. CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
In the case of Advanced Consulting and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales, which has
been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Advanced Consulting and Marketing, Inc. argues 18 U.S.C. § 48 is a content-based
restriction on speech which violates their First Amendment right of freedom of
speech.57 A regulation on speech which focuses on the content of the speech and
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,269.
49. Id. at 10270.
50. Id.
51. 199 Bill Tracking H.R. 1887 (LEXIS).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
56. Id. at 246.
57. Complaint, supra note 9.
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the direct impact it has on its "listeners" is considered a content-based regulation.58
Further, regulations on speech are considered content-based if the purpose and de-
sign of the statute is to regulate speech based solely on what is being said.59 Sta-
tutes which are intended or designed to suppress the expressions of specific speak-
ers are contradictory to basic First Amendment principles, and the Supreme Court
has stated that "all content-based regulations restrictions on speech must give us
more than a moment's pause.q
6°
Courts have discussed the level of scrutiny to be applied to a statute restricting
speech based on its content in numerous cases. Specifically, the government may
not prohibit speech simply because society finds the speech or expression disagree-
able or offensive. 61 In order for the government to legitimately enact a content-
based regulation, the government must meet the strict scrutiny test, in which they
must prove the statute advances a compelling governmental interest and is narrow-
ly tailored to advance that compelling interest. 62 The purpose of the test is to en-
sure speech is restricted no more than necessary to achieve a compelling interest,
so that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.63
When applying the definition of content-based regulations to 18 U.S.C. § 48, it
is apparent the statute is a content-based regulation of speech. The statute crimina-
lizes the sale, creation, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. 64 The restric-
tion is based solely on the content of the speech.65 Clearly, the statute is designed
and intended to punish the content of the speech, which is animal cruelty, not the
actual act of selling, creating, or possessing videos or other depictions. 66 Since the
statute is a content based regulation, the government must meet the strict scrutiny
test, meaning the government must prove there is a compelling governmental inter-
est in suppressing depictions of animal cruelty, and that the regulation is narrowly
tailored to advance that compelling interest.67 The two prongs of the strict scrutiny
test will be discussed in detail in the next two sections.
A. Compelling Governmental Interest
For the government to restrict content based speech, it must first prove there is
a compelling governmental interest for doing so. 68 In the past, the Supreme Court
has found a compelling governmental interest in areas such as "safeguarding the
58. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (The Supreme Court determined a statute was a content
based regulation of speech because it prohibited persons from displaying signs, flags, placards, etc., which could
be seen as critical of a foreign government, within 500 feet of embassies of foreign governments).
59. U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000).
60. Id. at 812, 826.
61. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victim's Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991)
(quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)).
62. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 781 (2005).
63. Id. at 778-79.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2008).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (describing the two prong strict scrutiny test to be used
when the government has enacted a content based regulation).
68. Id.
Vol. 12
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physical and psychological well being of a minor" and preventing sexual abuse and
exploitation of children. 69 The Court has also found a governmental interest in
protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals.7°
The government gave many reasons for why it has a compelling interest in pu-
nishing depictions of animal cruelty. The first interest the House of Representa-
tives maintained was compelling enough to pass the bill was to prevent cruelty to
animals. 7' The Supreme Court has determined that preventing cruelty to animals is
a compelling governmental interest.72 Since preventing cruelty to animals has been
established as a compelling governmental interest, it must be shown that the regu-
lation on the speech is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.73 In other words,
it must be shown that punishing the sale, creation, and possession of depictions of
animal cruelty is narrowly tailored to advance the government's interest in prevent-
ing cruelty to animals.
The House of Representatives also gave other possible governmental interests,
neither of which is compelling. Representative Bachus of Alabama argued the
government has an interest in preventing young people from viewing depictions of
animal cruelty because it could be a gateway to crimes such as murder. 74 Repre-
sentative Constance Morella of Maryland maintained the government has an inter-
est in preventing violence against humans, as well as decreasing domestic vi-
olence. 75 The author of the bill stated many serial killers killed animals before kill-
ing people, and many studies show that those who commit violent acts against an-
imals later commit violent acts on people. 76 Though these are legitimate govern-
mental interests, they are not considered compelling interests which would justify
suppressing protected speech.7 7 The Supreme Court has stated that speech may not
be prohibited simply because it deals with a subject that offends the public's sensi-
bilities, or because it could possibly lead to future crime.78 Because the Supreme
Court has clearly established that this reasoning falls short of the criteria necessary
to establish a compelling governmental interest, the government must base the first
prong of its argument solely on the prevention of cruelty to animals.
69. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
70. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeab, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993).
71. See Con. Rec. H. 10267 (several members of the House of Representatives discuss their reasoning for
supporting the bill, as well as the interest the government has in passing the bill).
72. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 538.
73. See Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (stating when a statute is a content based regulation, it must
be struck down unless it is narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental interest).
74. CONG. REC. H. at 10,271.
75. Id. (Ms. Morella claims abusers threaten to harm animals to show they have control of their home, and
that there is growing concern that violence perpetrated on animals often escalates into violence against humans).
76. Id. at 10,269.
77. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (stating the prospect of crime alone does
not justify laws suppressing speech which is protected).
78. Id.
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B. Narrowly Tailored
For a content based regulation on speech to be valid, it must be narrowly tai-
lored to advance a compelling governmental interest. 79 A statute is considered
narrowly tailored if "(1) it employs the least restrictive means to achieve its goal
and (2) there is a nexus between the government's compelling interest and the re-
striction., 80 Therefore, it must be determined if 18 U.S.C § 48 is narrowly tailored
to advance the interest of preventing cruelty to animals.
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, the Court determined the constitutionality of a statute that prohi-
bited the practice of animal sacrifice. 81 The statute contained an exception for li-
censed establishments that killed animals "specifically raised for food purposes.
82
The constitutionality of the statute was challenged by members of the Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, who practiced the Santeria religion, which used animal
sacrifice in their rituals.83 Although the Court found a legitimate governmental
interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the Court decided this interest could be
addressed by a restriction that did not go as far as prohibiting all of the Santeria
sacrificial practices. 84 The Court found that although the city of Hialeah had an
interest in the adequate care of its animals, it could regulate the conditions and
treatment of the animals rather than criminalize the possession and sacrifice of the
animals.85 In other words, the city had other ways to protect the animals that did
not criminalize their ritual sacrifice, which resulted in a violation of the Church's
First Amendment right of freedom of religion. 86
When applying the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye reasoning to 18 U.S.C. §
48, it is evident the statute is not narrowly tailored to advance the interest of pre-
venting cruelty to animals.87 In the House of Representatives debate on the bill,
Representative Scott of Virginia argued that the bill intends to prevent animal cru-
elty by stopping the creation and distribution of films depicting animal cruelty
when used for commercial purposes. 88 Further, he stated the bill could be narrowly
tailored by actually prosecuting those who are engaged in activities considered to
be cruel to animals. 89 Representative Barr of Georgia noted that all fifty states al-
ready have laws to prevent cruelty to animals. 9° This means that, as in the Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye case, there are other ways to advance the compelling
79. Se. Booksellers, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
80. Id.
81. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527-28 (1993).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 525.
84. Id. at 538.
85. Id. at 539.
86. See id.
87. See 145 CONG. REc. H. at 10,267 (in which several members of the House of Representatives discuss
their reasoning for supporting the bill, as well as the interest the government has in passing the bill).
88. Id. at 10,268.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 10,269.
210 Vol. 12
8
Barry Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol12/iss1/6
Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty
governmental interest that do not violate a person's First Amendment rights. 9'
Since all fifty states have laws preventing cruelty to animals, this law punishing the
creation, possession, and sale of depictions of animal cruelty is not the least restric-
tive means possible to advance that interest. A statute which suppresses constitu-
tionally protected speech is unacceptable if there are less restrictive alternatives
that could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate interest of the state
advanced by the statute. 92 As Representative Paul of Texas stated, this bill is not
needed because it should be adequate that all fifty states already have laws against
cruelty and violence to animals.93
Several Representatives argued that the bill is narrowly tailored, and would
therefore pass the strict scrutiny test. 94 Representative Sam Farr of California, who
argued in support of the bill, maintained the bill was narrowly tailored because it
does not preempt any state laws against animal cruelty, but incorporates the animal
cruelty law of the state in which the offense occurs. 95 Representative Jackson-Lee
of Texas was concerned about the bill violating the First Amendment, but decided
it does address a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to the creation,
possession, and sale of a known depiction of animal cruelty, which is illegal in the
state in which the creation, possession, and sale took place. 96 These arguments do
not seem to show that the bill is narrowly tailored. The compelling interest is to
prevent cruelty to animals, and the way to do that by the least restrictive means is
to criminalize the actual act of cruelty inflicted upon the animal. Punishing the
person who may not have been involved in the actual cruel act, but sold a video of
the cruel act, is not narrowly tailored to pass the strict scrutiny test. Therefore, 18
U.S.C. § 48 is a content based regulation on speech which does not pass the strict
scrutiny test.
IV. OVERBROAD
In the case of Advanced Consulting and Marketing Inc. v. Gonzales, Advanced
Consulting and Marketing, Inc. also claims 18 U.S.C. § 48 is a violation of the First
Amendment because it is overbroad and chills their freedom of speech.97 A statute
is considered overbroad if it punishes a "substantial amount of protected free
speech, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.", 98 If a statute
is found to be overbroad, all enforcement of that law is invalidated. 99 The statute
will be invalidated unless and until the part of the statute deemed invalidated is
91. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 539.
92. Se. Booksellers Ass'n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (2005).
93. CONG. REC..H. at 10,270.
94. See id. (several Representatives in support of the bill argue it is narrowly tailored to advance a compel-
ling governmental interest).
95. Id. at 10,273.
96. Id. at 10,272.
97. Complaint, supra note 9, at 6.
98. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973)).
99 Id at 119.
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narrowed to remove the threat to protected speech.' ° Overbreadth has been
created as a remedy in response to a concern that the enforcement of an overbroad
statute may "deter or chill constitutionally protected speech," especially when the
state imposes criminal sanctions on violations of the statute.'0' A statute is consi-
dered to chill speech if the regulation punishes speech in a way that a person is
more likely to simply abstain from expressing the protected speech rather than go
through the burden of "vindicating their rights through case by case litigation.',
10 2
This would cause harm not only to the person abstaining from expressing their
protected speech, but to society as a whole by depriving "an uninhibited market-
place of ideas."' 3 In order for a statute to be deemed invalid as overbroad, the
application of the statute to protected speech must be "substantial."'0 4 In determin-
ing if a statute is overbroad, the court must look at the law as a whole judged in
relation to its "legitimate sweep."'0 5
Statutes can be facially challenged for being overbroad in two different
ways. 106 The first way in which a statute can be facially challenged for being over-
broad is if the statute "could never be applied in a valid manner. 10 7 The second
way to facially challenge a statute for being overbroad is if the statute "may inhibit
the constitutionally protected speech of third parties."' 08 This facial challenge can
only succeed if the statute is "substantially overbroad."109 This means that if a
court can find there is a "realistic danger" the statute will significantly compromise
the recognized First Amendment protections of persons not before the court, it will
be found on its face to be overbroad. 110
On his website The Volokh Conspiracy, Eugene Volokh"' discusses 18 U.S.C.
§ 48 and the possible protected speech it could punish. 112 He maintains that as the
statute is currently written, it would punish not only "crush" videos, but would also
punish the following: a television program showing foreign bullfights shot in a
country where they are legal but sold in a state in which they are illegal, a maga-
zine with photographs of people killing endangered animals illegally in a foreign
country, and a magazine with photographs of people committing acts of cruelty to
animals that are shown with the intent to expose and punish the cruelty.' '1 This
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 119-20.
105. Id. at 122.
106. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988).
107. Id. (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Eugene Volokh is the Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law at UCLA. He teaches Religion Clauses law,
free speech law, academic legal writing, and criminal law. Prior to becoming a law professor, he clerked for 9"'
Cir. Judge Alex Kozinski and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Information obtained from EUGENE VOLOKH,
ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT NOTES, SEMINAR PAPERS, AND GETTING ON
LAW REVIEW, (Foundation Press 2007).
112. Eugene Volokh, The Volokh Conspiracy, The First Amendment and Cockfight Videos, July 11, 2007,
http://volokh.com/posts/I184174039.shtml (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
113. Id.
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would mean the statute is overbroad because it has the potential to punish speech
protected by the First Amendment, which was not originally intended to be pu-
nished by the statute." 4 The intent of the statute is to enable the police and prose-
cutors to punish those who sell "crush" videos, but it is possible forms of speech
other than "crush" videos (such as those listed above) could be chilled or punished
as well.
During the House of Representatives debate on 18 U.S.C. § 48, Representative
McCollum claimed the bill is not overbroad because there is an exception to the
bill's prohibition if the material in question has serious political, scientific, reli-
gious, journalistic, educational, artistic, or historic value." 5 He argues this would
ensure a program about Spain showing bull fighting or a documentary on elephant
poaching would not violate the statute.1 6 He also argues the sale of depictions of
legal activities, such as fishing and hunting, would also not violate the statute. 
1 7
This would be true if courts interpreted the statute in the way the House of Repre-
sentatives intends the courts to interpret the statute, but as Representative Paul
noted, Congress' legislation is often misinterpreted by the courts." 8 Eugene Vo-
lokh also makes the argument that while the statute exempts some material with
serious value, the test as to what "serious religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value" incorporates is a subjective test, and some
jurors or judges may feel that a video depicting bull fighting has no serious val-
ue. 119 He also notes the "serious value" exception is a small safe harbor. 1
20
Due to the substantial amount of speech other than "crush" videos that could be
punished under 18 U.S.C. § 48, the scope of the statute is overbroad. Even though
there are exceptions to the statute, the exceptions could be interpreted in different
ways by different judges and juries. A depiction that is intended to fall into an
exception could be interpreted as violating the statute by a judge in one area of the
country, while a judge in another area of the country may feel it does not violate
the statute because it falls into an exception. The statute could punish speech that
was intended to be protected because of the way in which the statute is interpreted
by the courts. Therefore, the statute is a violation of the First Amendment due to
being overbroad and chilling protected speech.
V. VAGUE
Moreover, Advanced Consulting and Marketing, Inc. also claims in its lawsuit
that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is unconstitutional because it is vague as to the conduct that is
prohibited.'12  A vague statute is unconstitutional because it violates the due
114. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) (stating a statute is considered overbroad if it punishes a
"substantial amount of protected free speech, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."').
115. 145 CONG. REc. H10,267 (1999).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 10,270.
119. Volokh, supra note 113.
120. 1d.
121. Complaint, supra note 9.
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process clause of the Constitution. 12 2 Additionally, a statute is considered vague if
it does not give persons of "reasonable intelligence" adequate notice that certain
conduct is punishable by the law, or if it does not provide "sufficient standards" by
which innocence or guilt can be determined. 
23
Statutes are presumed to be valid, and their constitutionality should be upheld
whenever possible.124 However, an accused has a constitutional guarantee to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. 125 This re-
quires statutes to describe unlawful conduct with "sufficient particularity and clari-
ty such that ordinary persons of reasonable intelligence are capable of discerning
its meaning and confirming their conduct thereto."'' 26 In other words, the "void for
vagueness" doctrine requires the statute to define the criminal offense with enough
definiteness so that an ordinary person can understand what conduct is prohibited,
and define the offense in a manner that does not promote discriminatory or arbi-
trary enforcement. 127 The proponent of a "void for vagueness" argument must
show that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its possible applications.1
2 8
When a court makes a determination on vagueness, the court does so on an as-
applied, case by case basis. 1
29
Eugene Volokh notes the possibility of the vagueness of 18 U.S.C. § 48. 30 He
noted how the exception for "serious religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value" could be interpreted in different ways by
different judges and juries. 131 In the House of Representatives debate on the bill,
Representative Gallegly, the author of the bill, stated the bill would not prohibit
groups like the Humane Society from creating educational videos on animal cruelty
because that would fall into an exception. 132 A video such as one described by Mr.
Gallegly should fall into an exception to the statute; however, there is nothing in
the statute to guide courts on how to interpret the exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 48 gives
definitions to clarify what is meant by "depiction of animal cruelty" and "State,"
but does not give any definition to clarify what the terms covered by the exception
mean. 133 This would lead an ordinary person to wonder if the video they are selling
falls into an exception or not, which could lead the person to suppress their consti-
tutionally protected speech. 134 The lack of a definition clarifying any of the excep-
tions could also lead to arbitrary and possible discriminatory enforcement of the
122. Louisiana v. Sandifer, 679 So. 2d 1324, 1331 (La. 1996).
123. Id.
124. Louisiana v. Hart, 687 So. 2d 94, 95 (La. 1997).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1997).
128. Id.
129. United States v. Overstreet, 106 F.3d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1997).
130. Volokh, supra note 112.
131. Id.
132. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,270.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2008).
134. United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating the "void for vagueness" doctrine
requires the statute to define the criminal offense with enough definiteness so that an ordinary person can under-
stand what conduct is prohibited).
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statute by the courts since the courts could have a wide latitude in how they interp-
ret the exceptions to the statute. 135
It appears that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is void due to being vague. Reading the statute,
one would not be able to determine exactly what conduct is prohibited by the sta-
tute, and what conduct is allowed as an exception to the statute. This is due to the
fact that there is no clear definition of what the exceptions to the statute mean, even
though those exceptions would be necessary to guide a person in determining if he
or she is violating the statute or not. The courts are also able to interpret the statute
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, since they do not have clear guidance on
how to interpret the statutory exceptions. As a result, 18 U.S.C. § 48 is "void for
vagueness."
VI. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY EXCEPTION AND ITS RELATION TO 18 U.S.C. § 48
Child Pornography is a well established exception to First Amendment free-
dom of speech protection.1 36 There are many correlations between child pornogra-
phy laws and 18 U.S.C. § 48.131 If the statute falls into the child pornography ex-
ception to the First Amendment, the statute will be upheld as a valid restriction on
speech.
Eugene Volokh discusses whether the child pornography exception should be
extended to cover 18 U.S.C. § 48. 38 First, he notes that cases of child pornography
and depictions of animal cruelty both allow for restrictions on the distribution of
speech because of how the speech was created.139 Second, he argues that the sta-
tute should fall under the child pornography exception because the production of
animal cruelty videos, like the production of child pornography videos, can be
created in private, but have generally public distributions. 140 Third, he notes that a
ban on the actual production of cruelty videos would be very hard to enforce, much
like the production of child pornography videos.141 Fourth, he maintains that as
long as money can be made from distributing the cruelty videos, there will be
someone willing to produce the videos, as is the case with child pornography. 1
42
Finally, he argues that distribution needs to be stopped in order to prevent the harm
that occurs when the videos are made. 1
43
Professor Volokh also makes arguments against extending the child pornogra-
phy exception to 18 U.S.C. § 48.144 He argues that the statute may suppress a lot of
valuable speech, including bullfighting videos, since the exceptions are too va-
135. Id. (stating the "void for vagueness" doctrine requires the statute to define the criminal offense in a
manner that does not promote discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement).
136. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (stating freedom of speech does not
embrace pornography produced with real children).
137. See Volokh, supra note 112.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Volokh, supra note 112.
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gue. 145 He notes the statute punishing depictions of animal cruelty will suppress
more valuable speech than the child pornography law, because depictions of animal
cruelty are more likely to be legitimate art or relevant to political debates than de-
pictions of sex or lewd pictures involving children. 146 Finally, he argues the harm
the distribution of depictions of animal cruelty causes (indirectly furthering animal
cruelty) is much less severe than the harm child pornography causes (indirectly
furthering the exploitation of children). 147 He notes the legal system itself sees the
exploitation of children as much more severe than animal cruelty. 148 Sexual abuse
of children is punished far more severely than animal cruelty, and cockfighting is
not even a crime in Puerto Rico, though Congress could have made it a crime
there. 1
49
To have a full understanding of whether 18 U.S.C. § 48 should fall under the
child pornography exception to First Amendment protection, there needs to be
more discussion of why the courts allow an exception to the First Amendment
speech protection for child pornography. New York v. Ferber was a major child
pornography case heard by the United States Supreme Court. 50 The statute at is-
sue in that case stated "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a
child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or
promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than six-
teen years of age.' 5' To promote means "to procure, manufacture, issue, sell give,
provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, dis-
seminate, present, exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same.' ' 152 The
issue in New York v. Ferber was whether, to prevent the abuse of children who are
made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes, the legislature could
prohibit dissemination of material showing children engaging in sexual conduct
without violating the First Amendment, regardless of whether or not the material
produced is obscene. 5 3 This issue is very similar to the issue regarding 18 U.S.C.
§ 48, which is whether the legislature can prohibit dissemination of material show-
ing cruelty to animals to prevent the abuse of animals without violating the First
Amendment. In the case of child pornography, the Supreme Court found that the
legislature could prohibit the dissemination of material showing children engaging
in sexual conduct without violating the First Amendment in order to prevent child
abuse. '54
The Supreme Court gave many reasons for allowing greater leeway for statutes
violating the First Amendment's protection of speech when dealing with the dis-
145. 1d.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
151. Id. at 751.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 753.
154. Id. at 753, 774.
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semination of child pornography. 155 First, the state has a compelling interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor."156 The Court
has sustained legislation over time aimed at protecting the emotional and physical
well being of children, even if the laws have the potential to violate a constitution-
ally protected right. 157 Using children as subjects of pornography is so harmful to
the mental, emotional, and physiological health of the child that the Court feels a
statute prohibiting child pornography "passes muster under the First Amend-
ment."
158
The above reason could not apply to the prohibition against the distribution of
depictions of animal cruelty. This is because the Supreme Court has found in the
past that the government does have a legitimate interest in preventing cruelty to
animals, but this interest could be advanced through means other than by violating
a constitutional right.'5 9 Also, as Professor Volokh noted, the justice system sees
the exploitation and abuse of children as much more severe than cruelty to animals,
so abuse of children will be punished much more severely than cruelty to ani-
mals. 1
60
The second reason the Supreme Court gives for allowing greater leeway for
child pornography statutes that violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech is
that the distribution of child pornography is related to the sexual abuse of child-
ren. 161 Child pornography is related to the sexual abuse of children in that the ma-
terial produced is a permanent record of the child's participation in the pornogra-
phy, and the child is further harmed by circulation of the material. 62 The network
in which child pornography is distributed must be closed if there is to be control
over the production of child pornography. 163 The production of child pornography
is secret; however, there is a need to market it publicly to sell it. 164 The only prac-
tical way for law enforcement to "dry up the market" is to have severe punishments
for those who sell, advertise, or promote child pornography. 1
65
The reasoning behind banning child pornography has many similarities to the
reasoning given by Congress when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 48. First, the fact that a
child is further harmed by the circulation of the material is not applicable to videos
showing cruelty to animals. This is because animals cannot be re-victimized by the
distribution of videos showing cruel acts that were done to them in the past in the
way that children can. However, much of the production of animal cruelty videos,
like the production of child pornography, is done in private. 166 The distribution of
155. See id. at 756.
156. Id. at 756-57.
157. Id. at 757.
158. Id. at 758.
159. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993).
160. Volokh, supra note 112.
161. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 760.
165. Id.
166. Volokh, supra note 112.
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the videos must be public. 167 As Representative McCollum noted, the faces of the
women on the "crush" videos cannot be seen, so often times there is no way to
prosecute the person inflicting the cruelty on the animal. 168 While this is true of
"crush" videos, as has already been shown, the statute would punish other depic-
tions of cruelty to animals in which the actual act of cruelty could be punished by
existing laws instead of by way of punishing the distribution or sale of the depic-
tion.
The third reason given by the Supreme Court for allowing greater leeway for
child pornography statutes to violate the First Amendment is that the advertising
and sale of child pornography provides an economic motive for, and is an integral
part of, the production of child pornography materials. 169 The Court states the pro-
duction of child pornography is illegal throughout the nation, and the constitutional
freedom of speech does not extend to speech used as an integral part of an act in
violation of a valid statute. 170 The Court did note that if the statutes outlawing em-
ployment of children in the films and photographs were effective, it would leave no
child pornography to be marketed.171 In essence, since the laws against the em-
ployment of children in child pornography are not effective, the laws against the
distribution, sale, and advertising of child pornography are allowed. 1
72
In the case of the distribution of depictions of animal cruelty, there are laws in
existence in every state against acts of animal cruelty. 173 The distribution of videos
depicting animal cruelty is not an integral part of most forms of animal cruelty. It
is true that the distribution of "crush" videos is an integral part of that particular
form of animal cruelty, but that is not the case for most forms of animal cruelty
which may fall under this statute. 174 If it were just "crush" videos covered under
this statute, the child pornography exception would apply. Since other forms of
depictions of animal cruelty are included, many of which existing animal cruelty
statutes enable authorities to prosecute, the overall statute does not fall into this
reason for the child pornography exception.
The fourth reason given by the Supreme Court for the child pornography ex-
ception is that the value of permitting depictions of children engaged in lewd sex-
ual conduct is modest, "if not de minimis."'7 The court found that the visual de-
pictions of children performing sexual acts are not an important or necessary part
167. Id.
168. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10267.
169. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
170. Id. at 761-62.
171. Id. at 762.
172. Id. (stating if the statutes outlawing employment of children in the films and photographs were effec-
tive, it would leave no child pornography to be marketed).
173. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,269 (Representative Barr of Georgia noted every one of the fifty states already
have laws addressing animal cruelty).
174. Id. at H10,267 (Representative McCollum of Florida noted that state authorities have been prevented
from using state animal cruelty laws to prosecute the makers of "crush" videos because "the faces of the women
inflicting the torture in the videos are often not depicted" and there is no way to know exactly when the depictions
were or where the depictions were made).
175. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
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of scientific or educational work, or a literary performance. 176 The Court main-
tained that if a depiction of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct was necessary
for artistic or literary value, a person over the statutory age who looked young
could be utilized. 1
77
As Representative McCollum noted, there is no redeeming value in "crush"
videos. 178 Whereas there is no doubt of the de minimis value of "crush" videos, it
has been shown that these videos are not the only depictions of animal cruelty that
are being punished or have the potential to be punished. It has been shown that the
statute is overbroad and vague, especially as to its exceptions. This could make it
so that depictions of animal cruelty, such as an educational documentary about the
dangers of cockfighting or dog fighting, could be punished as well. These types of
videos would have redeeming value in that they are bringing animal cruelty to the
forefront and are raising public awareness. Once again, this reason for the child
pornography exception would apply to the statute if only "crush" videos were cov-
ered by the statute, but this is not the case.
The child pornography exception to First Amendment free speech protection is
allowed for many reasons. Many of these reasons would allow for the exception to
apply to the statute at hand if the statute were more narrowly tailored to apply only
to "crush" videos. Since the statute has been shown to be overbroad and vague and
would incorporate more than just "crush" videos, the child pornography exception
does not apply.
VII. OBSCENITY EXCEPTION AND ITS RELATION TO 18 U.S.C. § 48
Obscenity is another well established exception to First Amendment freedom
of speech protection. 179 Obscene is defined as "disgusting to the senses" and "ab-
horrent to morality or virtue."' i80 There are correlations to be made between ob-
scenity and the speech sought to be restricted by 18 U.S.C. § 48.181 If the statute
falls into the obscenity exception to First Amendment freedom of speech protec-
tion, the statute will be a valid restriction on speech.
The leading case on the obscenity exception is Miller v. California, in which
the defendant used a mass mailing campaign to advertise "adult" books. 182 He was
prosecuted after sending five unsolicited brochures through the mail to a restau-
rant.18 3 The defendant was convicted under California's criminal obscenity statute
176. Id. at 762-63.
177. Id. at 763.
178. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
179. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (stating freedom of speech does not
embrace obscenity).
180. Merriam-Webster Online, http://m-w.com/dictionary (last visited Jan. 3, 2008).
181. See Volokh, supra note 112. (stating the statute does not fit in the existing obscenity exceptions, but the
statement President Clinton made while signing the bill, limiting it to "wanton cruelty to animals designed to
appeal to a prurient interest in sex" brings it closer to falling into the obscenity exception, but not entirely into the
obscenity exception).
182. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973).
183. Id. at 17-18.
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for knowingly distributing obscene material.184 The Supreme Court noted the First
Amendment has never been treated as an absolute, and it has been settled by the
Supreme Court that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.
85
The Court maintained that for a statute to validly regulate obscene material, it must
be "carefully limited."1 86 The Supreme Court put forth a set of guidelines for a
trier of fact to use when determining if restricted speech is considered obscene. 1
87
The first guideline is "whether 'the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pru-
rient interest."188 Prurient is defined as arousing an unwholesome desire or interest,
or appealing to or arousing a sexual desire. 189 When the trier of fact is determining
if the work appeals to a prurient interest, it is based on that particular community's
standards, not on a national standard.' 90 The second guideline is whether the work
describes or depicts, in a "patently offensive way," sexual conduct defined specifi-
cally by the applicable statute. 191 The third and final guideline is whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious artistic, scientific, political, or literary value. 1
92
In the law review article entitled Serial Killer Trading Cards and First
Amendment Values: A Defense of Content Based Regulation of Violent Expression,
Jendi Reiter discusses the way the obscenity exception can be used to allow restric-
tions on speech that are not sexually explicit. 193 Ms. Reiter notes that serial killer
trading cards are a new form of dangerous speech that promotes violence as
"amoral entertainment."' 94 She maintains that speech depicting violent acts has not
been an exception to First Amendment protection as obscene speech has.' 95 Fur-
ther, Ms. Reiter states that the Miller obscenity test would be a good starting point
to regulate "low value violent expression.' ' 196 The Supreme Court is not prevented
from creating a new category of speech excepted from First Amendment protec-
tion. 197 The Miller test could be used to create the new category of excepted
speech because the Miller test forces a regulation to be specific and narrow. 198 The
Miller test also has safe guards which ensure the fairness and accuracy of the
process by which the speech is determined to be obscene by the courts. 19 She
noted that the Eighth Circuit invalidated a ban on the rental or sale of videos to
184. Id. at 16.
185. Id. at 23.
186. Id. at 23-24.
187. Id. at24.
188. Id.
189. Merriam-Webster Online, supra note 180.
190. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
191. Id. at 24.
192. Id.
193. See Jendi Reiter, Serial Killer Trading Cards and First Amendment Values: A Defense of Content
Based Regulation of Violent Expression, 62 ALB. L. REV. 183 (1998).
194. Id. at 183.
195. Id. at 186-87.
196. Id. at 208.
197. Id. at 209.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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minors which appealed to "morbid interests in violence. '' 200 The court did state a
ban limited to "slasher" films which graphically portrayed rape, bestiality, murder,
or other "perversions" would be "less burdensome on protected expression.
' 201
Professor Volokh states there is an important difference between the third
prong of the Miller obscenity test and clause (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 48, which states
that the statute does not apply to depictions which have serious political, educa-
tional, scientific, religious, historical, artistic, or journalistic value.20 2 He maintains
that clause (b) does not say the work is to be judged "taken as a whole," which
makes the exception a "smaller safe harbor" than the exception under the Miller
203 ta
obscenity test. He notes that in President Clinton's signing statement, he stated
that the Justice Department should construe the law narrowly, which would mean
limiting it to "wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in
sex," which brings it closer to the obscenity exception, but not completely within
the obscenity exception. °4
Looking at the obscenity exception, as well as the article by Jendi Reiter, it ap-
pears 18 U.S.C. § 48 could be rewritten to fall into the obscenity exception to free-
dom of speech protection. The main intent of the statute is to prevent the produc-
tion and distribution of "crush" videos.20 5 If the statute could be written in a way
that is narrowly tailored to show that intent, it could fall into the obscenity excep-
tion, and would be a valid restriction on speech. Specifically, the "crush" videos
are intended to appeal to people with specific sexual fetishes who find these depic-
tions "sexually arousing.' '206 This shows the "crush" videos appeal to a prurient
207interest when taken as a whole, which satisfies the first prong of the Miller test.
An average person in any community across the United States, applying contempo-
rary community standards, would find that "crush" videos appeal to a prurient in-
terest.2°8
"Crush" videos, however, do not fully fall into the second part of the Miller
obscenity test, which states speech is obscene if the work describes or depicts sex-
ual conduct in a patently offensive way, which is specifically defined by the appli-
cable statute.20 9 While "crush" videos do not depict sexual conduct, they do depict
an activity which appeals to a specific sexual fetish.21° Jendi Reiter did note in her
article that the Eighth Circuit was willing to allow a limited ban on "slasher" films
which graphically portrayed rape, bestiality, murder, or other "perversions. 21!
200. Id. at 210 (citing Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 1992)).
201. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 968 F.2d at 689).
202. Volokh, supra note 112.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
206. Id.
207. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating the first guideline to the obscenity test is whether
the "average person" applying "contemporary community standards" would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to a prurient interest).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
211. Reiter, supra note 193, at 210 (citing Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 968 F.2d at 687).
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This would allow an exception for "crush" videos because descriptions of "crush"
videos show that they are graphically portraying the torture and death of small an-
imals, including dogs, cats, and monkeys.212 It does this in a patently offensive
way, therefore, if the statute specifically defines the patently offensive conduct, it
could pass muster under the second part of the Miller test.213
"Crush" videos fall into the third part of the Miller test, which requires the ob-
scene material, when taken as a whole, to lack serious political, artistic, literary, or
scientific value.2 14 These "crush" videos have no redeeming social or other value
because they show small animals being crushed to death by women, while the
women speak to them in vulgar language. 215 The purpose of selling these videos is
simply to supply an industry that has sprung up to appeal to this unusual sexual
fetish.21 6 If the bill is narrowly tailored to "crush" videos, it will pass this part of
the Miller test because "crush" videos do not have any serious political, artistic,
literary, or scientific value. As Professor Volokh notes, since the exception in the
current statute does not say the work has to be "taken as a whole," it does not fall
into the obscenity exception.21 7 If a new bill uses the term "taken as a whole"
when it makes an exception for serious value, it would pass this part of the Miller
test, and would be a valid restriction on speech.21 8
Putting the parts of the Miller obscenity test together, it appears a bill that cri-
minalizes the knowing creation, sale, or possession of a "crush" video with the
intention of placing it into foreign or interstate commerce for commercial gain
would validly restrict this form of speech.219 The statute could keep the words
"depictions of animal cruelty" if there is a clear definition stating that the phrase
"depictions of animal cruelty" is limited to "crush" videos. 220 There would need to
be a definition for "crush" videos which would include all types of "crush" videos
that are put into circulation. It is clear that an average person applying contempo-
rary community standards would see that this appeals to a prurient interest, that the
work depicts the death of an animal in a "patently offensive" way, and that it lacks
serious political, scientific, literary, or artistic value when taken as a whole. 22' This
would ensure the statute is written in a way to advance the congressional intent. 222
Since "crush" videos are almost impossible for authorities to prosecute, but other
forms of animal cruelty are not, this would ensure that the statute is narrowly tai-
lored to include only "crush" videos. This would make certain the statute was not
vague or overbroad. To completely fit into the Miller test, there would have to be
212. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
213. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
214. Id.
215. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267.
216. Id.
217. Volokh, supra note 112.
218. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (taking the original statute and changing it from depiction of animal cruelty to "crush"
videos).
220. Id.
221. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (applying the Miller obscenity test to "crush" videos).
222. See 145 CONG. REc. H. at 10,267 (in which the members of Congress supporting the bill discuss
"crush" videos and the need to have a way to prosecute those responsible for "crush" videos).
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an exception, stating "when taken as a whole," the depiction lacks serious literary,
political, scientific, or artistic value.223
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is no question that animal cruelty is not acceptable in the United States
and that people should be punished when they commit acts of animal cruelty. This
does not necessarily mean people should be punished for creating, selling, or pos-
sessing depictions of animal cruelty when there are other laws which can be used to
prosecute the person that actually committed the cruel act on the animal. The First
Amendment protects speech, even if the speech being protected is disagreeable or
offensive to society as a whole.224
Through 18 U.S.C. § 48, the government has criminalized the creation, sale,
and possession of depictions of animal cruelty, when the person has an intent to
place the depiction into foreign or interstate commerce.225 The main intent of the
statute is to punish the sale of "crush" videos, in which a small animal is tied down
and a woman crushes the animal slowly with her bare feet or in stiletto high heels
while speaking vulgar to the animal. 226 The way the statute is written, however,
makes the statute unconstitutional. It has been shown the statute is an invalid re-
striction on content based speech, is overbroad, and vague. It has also been shown
that the statute does not fall within the child pornography exception to freedom of
speech protection. As written, the statute does not fall within the obscenity excep-
tion to freedom of speech either.
Just because the statute appears to be unconstitutional as written does not mean
all is lost. The statute can be rewritten so that the intent of the statute is advanced
without violating the First Amendment. The statute must be narrowly written to
fall within the obscenity exception to freedom of speech protection. To do this, the
intent of punishing those involved in the "crush" video industry must be made ap-
parent in the statute.227 The statute must only apply to "crush" videos and the ex-
ceptions must state the work is to be "taken as a whole.,
228
The "crush" video industry is very disturbing and repulsive. It is important
that those who create and sell these videos are punished severely for torturing the
animals to death. Under existing animal cruelty laws, it is almost impossible to
punish those who are actually torturing the animals.229 Since it is likely the statute
will be found unconstitutional, Congress should work on writing a new bill that is
narrowly tailored to punishing only those depictions of animal cruelty that are con-
223. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (applying the third part of the Miller obscenity test to "crush" videos).
224. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victim's Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2008).
226. See 145 CoNG. REC. H. at 10,267 (in which the members of Congress supporting the bill discuss
"crush" videos and the need to have a way to prosecute those responsible for "crush" videos).
227. Id.
228. See Volokh, supra note 112 (stating the statute does not fit into the obscenity exception because the
exceptions do not say the work is to be "taken as a whole").
229. 145 CONG. REC. H. at 10,267 (1999).
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sidered "crush" videos. If this is done, it may bring about the end of this repulsive
industry.
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